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LETHAL SPEED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED RULE TO IMPLEMENT VESSEL SPEED
RESTRICTIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
DECLINING RIGHT WHALE POPULATION AS
WELL AS THE SHIPPING AND WHALE-
WATCHING INDUSTRIES
Tamara Nicole Norris*
And one rose in a tent of sea and gave
A darkening shudder; water fell away;
The whale stood shining, and then sank in spray.1
I. INTRODUCTION
North Atlantic right whales (Eubalaena glacialis) [hereinafter right
whales] were severely depleted by commercial whaling, despite protection
from commercial whaling as early as 1935.2  Currently, ship strikes and fish
net entanglements are the two primary causes of mortality among right
whales, and thus the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)3 has
targeted these two areas in its implementation of rules and regulations
designed to protect right whales.  In 2006, NMFS proposed a new set of
regulations designed to implement vessel speed restrictions on vessels
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4. Office of Protected Resources, Northern Right Whale, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
species/mammals/cetaceans/rightwhale_northern.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008) [hereinafter
OPR 2].
5. Id.
6. Id. 
7. Id.  Some of the comments NMFS received in response to this proposed regulation
were from organizations dedicated to protecting the waters off Georgia and Florida, and their
concerns stemmed from protecting the calving grounds in that area.  See infra note 153; see
also infra note 121.
8. See OPR 2, supra note 4.
9. Id.
sixty-five feet or greater in length, in certain areas and at certain times of
the year.  
This Comment addresses the new proposed regulation, and the
comments NMFS received in response to its proposal.  In addition, this
Comment analyzes whether NMFS has considered all possible scenarios in
its proposal for vessel speed restrictions.  This analysis includes whether
NMFS gave due regard to the myriad of scientific evidence suggesting that
vessel speed is a key factor in the mortality of right whales, and what
economic impacts this restriction may have on commerce.  This Comment
also addresses the prior regulations implemented by NMFS, other
protections for the right whale, and whether there were other more
practicable alternatives to this new proposed regulation.  
II. RIGHT WHALES AND THE LINK BETWEEN RIGHT 
WHALE MORTALITY AND SHIP STRIKES
A.  Eubalaena Glacialis
Right whales are large baleen whales, and adults grow to about forty-
five to fifty-five feet in length, and live for approximately fifty years,
although there is little data on the longevity of the species.4  They can
weigh as much as seventy tons; females are larger than males.5  Females
give birth at approximately nine to ten years of age.6  In the western North
Atlantic, calving occurs from Georgia to Florida between December and
March.7  Right whales are one of the most critically endangered large whale
species in the world.8  They inhabit both the Northern and Southern
Hemispheres and are found in three general areas: the North Pacific, the
North Atlantic, and the Southern Hemispheres.9  They were once highly
important commercially as they were the “right” whale to catch; they
“swam slowly, yielded good quantities of oil and baleen and floated after
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10. Knowlton & Kraus, supra note 2, at 193.
11. OPR 2, supra note 4.  The 1931 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling took
effect in 1935.  Id.   Since 1949, right whales have been protected from commercial whaling
by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and its implementing convention (to which
the United States is a party).  Id.  See generally International Whaling Commission, IWC
Information, http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/iwcmain.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008)
(providing useful background information about the IWC).  Right whales in the United
States are protected by the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA).  See infra Part III. A-B.  
12. OPR 2, supra note 4.  
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id.
18. Id.  The North Pacific population and the North Atlantic population were the subject
of two recently proposed rules by NMFS.  Proposed Endangered Status for North Atlantic
Right Whales, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,704, 77,711 (proposed Dec. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 224). NMFS completed a comprehensive review of the status of both of the
species; it determined that they are separate species, and that they are both in danger of
extinction.  Id.  The two proposed rules aim to list the North Atlantic right whale and the
Northern Pacific right whale as separate endangered species.  Id.
19. Office of Protected Resources, Southern right whale, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
species/mammals/cetaceans/rightwhale_southern.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter
OPR 3].  
they were killed.”10  The right whale has been protected from commercial
harvest since 1935, but has continued to decline in numbers.11  The western
North Atlantic population is believed to be the highest of all right whale
populations in the Northern Hemisphere, with a stock of about 300.12
However, the current trend of reduction in population suggests that the
right whales will be extinct in less than 200 years.13
 The North Pacific population of right whales was at about 11,000
whales before exploitation.14  In the 1960’s, this population was subjected
to illegal hunting by the Soviet Union, and the extent of this damage is
unknown.15  Currently, the North Pacific population is uncertain.16  There
are no data trends for either the eastern or the western populations.17
However, in recent years, small groups of adults have been sighted, albeit
there has been only one confirmed sighting of calves in the twentieth
century.18
The Southern right whale population has quite a different history.  This
population was around 60,000 individuals prior to exploitation.19  After
extensive whaling in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the New
Zealand Southern right whale population was considered commercially
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20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.  The best known areas are Argentina, Australia, and South Africa.  Id.  
23. Knowlton & Kraus, supra note 2, at 193.  Some of the other factors affecting the
population of right whales include habitat degradation (right whales are dependent on
highly-developed coastal waters, and frequent areas where dredging and dredge soil disposal
occur on a regular basis), noise, and increased ship traffic.  Proposed Endangered Status for
North Atlantic Right Whales, 71 Fed. Reg. at 77,708-710.  It is unknown to what extent each
of these factors affect the population, and more scientific evidence is necessary to make this
determination.  Id.
24. Report of the Workshop on the Comprehensive Assessment of Right Whales: A
Worldwide Comparison, 2 J. CETACEAN RES. & MGMT. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 29 (2001)
[hereinafter Comprehensive Assessment Report].
25. Id.
26. Proposed Endangered Status for North Atlantic Right Whales, 71 Fed. Reg. at
77,710.
27. Comprehensive Assessment Report, supra note 24, at 29. Right whales have been
observed engaging in active surface behavior, skim feeding and nursing, and do not seem
to be aware of approaching small vessels.  Id.  Right whales’ vulnerability to ship strikes
may also be a result of more streamlined vessels which produce less noise, wake, and the
hydrodynamic effects of ships.  Id.  
extinct.20  There is evidence to suggest that part of this population has
increased since the 1940’s, with some breeding stocks having an estimated
growth rate of 7%.21  Worldwide, the current population is estimated at
7000.22
B.  Vessel Strikes and the Unprecedented Deaths of Right Whales
Ship strikes are one of the greatest known causes of death for North
Atlantic right whales.23  Right whale injuries and mortalities can be
attributed to vessel strikes by looking at external signs of trauma and
necropsy results indicating internal trauma.24   Propeller lacerations have
led scientists to conclude that large vessels are most often associated with
the mortalities of whales, based “on the presence of larger propeller cuts,
broken bones, severed flukes and broad areas of blunt trauma.”25  Scientific
evidence suggests that because there is a low incidence of photographic
evidence of scars from ship strikes and a high incidence of propeller scars
and wounds on carcasses, a high proportion of the ship and whale
interactions (size of the vessel not taken into account) result in right whale
mortality.26  This is compounded by the fact that right whales may be
especially vulnerable to ship strikes based on their patterns of behavior.27
Several scientific studies report that from 1970-1999, forty-five right
whale deaths were documented, twenty-nine of which were attributed to
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28. Knowlton & Kraus, supra note 2, at 195.
29. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions to Reduce the Threat of Ship
Collisions with North Atlantic Right Whales, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299, 36,307 (proposed June
26, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224) [hereinafter Proposed Rule to Implement
Speed Restrictions].   
30. Scott D. Kraus et al., North Atlantic Right Whales in Crisis, SCIENCE 561, 561
(2005).
31. Id.
32. Id.  
33. Id.
34. Id.  This scientific report estimates that because of the deaths of these four females
bearing near-term fetuses, and since the average lifetime calf production is 5.25 calves, “the
deaths of these females represent a lost reproductive potential of as many as 21 animals.”
Id.
35. Proposed Endangered Status for North Atlantic Right Whales, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,704,
77,710 (proposed Dec. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224).
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 77,704.  This fact regarding whale-watching vessels becomes important as
many whale-watching companies contend, in the comments to this regulation, that operators
of such vessels are inherently more careful and aware of their surroundings and thus do not
cause many, if any, ship collisions with right whales. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed
Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299, 36,309 (proposed June 26, 2006) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 224).  For more information on whale-watching and its potential negative impacts
human activities.28  Nine right whale ship strike deaths occurred between
1997 and 2001 alone.29  One report indicated that the overall mortality rate
was increasing to about 4% per year from 1980-1998.30  This mortality rate
suggests that fourteen whales die each year.  This level of mortality is one
at which the survival of the species is not sustainable.31  However, in the
last twenty years, 2.4 whale deaths have been reported annually, which
represents a detection rate of 17%.32  In addition, in just sixteen months
there were “eight recorded deaths, including six adult females (three were
carrying near-term fetuses).”33  Four were killed by human activities, three
from ship strikes and one by fishing gear, a fifth “was probably killed by
a ship,” and two whales could not be retrieved for examination.34
Two collisions by whale-watching vessels and a humpback whale and
minke whale have prompted NMFS to look more closely at these high-
speed vessels and their potential for serious injury or death to right
whales.35  The number of high-speed whale-watching vessels and ferries
(high-speed is twenty-eight knots or greater) has increased recently in areas
where right whales frequent.36  In recognizing this fact, NMFS stated that
it may be necessary to examine the speed at which these vessels are
traveling, the effects these vessels have in the vicinity of right whales, and
issue regulations and/or guidelines “regarding the number of vessels, and
their speed, manner and distances of approaches near whales.”37
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on right whales, see Comprehensive Assessment Report, supra note 24, at 31.  It is also
worth noting that big container ships can go as fast as twenty to twenty-five knots.  Editorial,
Brake for Whales, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 2006, at A14.
38. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. at  36,303.  In addition
to the difficulty in ascertaining the manner of death based on the carcass of the whale, many
whales caught in fishing gear lose some of their blubber before dying, which causes them
to sink, and thus their carcasses are rarely recovered.  Brake for Whales, supra note 37.
39. NOAA, NORTHERN RIGHT WHALE (EUBALAENA GLACIALIS): WESTERN ATLANTIC
STOCK 12, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/sars/ao2005whnr-w.pdf.  
40. Laura Crimaldi, Feds Try to do Right by Whales, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 13, 2006,
at sec. 5.  Dr. Bill Hogarth, assistant administrator for NOAA Fisheries Service, feels
similarly.  He stated that, “[w]ith a population so low, even one whale death can set back
recovery efforts dramatically.”  Press Release, NOAA, NOAA Recommends New East Coast
Ship Traffic Routes to Reduce Collisions with Endangered Whales (Nov. 17, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/mediacenter/docs/111406_ShipTrafficRoutes_FINAL_
RHD.pdf [hereinafter NOAA Press Release].  
41. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 346, 637 (3d ed. 2006).
42. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1) (1994).
43. Id. § 1361(2).  Optimum sustainable population means, “with respect to any
population stock, the number of animals which will result in the maximum productivity of
the population or the species, keeping in mind the carrying capacity of the habitat and the
health of the ecosystem of which they form a constituent element.”  Id. § 1362(9).
These numbers may not be entirely accurate, and in fact may be higher,
because many deaths go undetected or unreported, and in some cases it is
nearly impossible to tell the manner of death from a recovered carcass.38
Although the “total level of human-caused mortality and serious injury is
unknown . . .  reported human-caused mortality and serious injury has been
a minimum of 2.6 right whales per year from 1999 through 2003.”39
Because no mortality or serious injury can be considered insignificant,
many scientists believe that “wiping out the one to two ship strike deaths
that occur ever year” would help to stabilize the species.40
III. OTHER PROTECTIONS AFFORDED THE RIGHT WHALE
A.  Marine Mammal Protection Act
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was a response by
Congress to the growing concerns among the scientific and conservation
communities about the growing threats to marine mammals.41  Congress
found that certain marine mammals were in danger of extinction or
depletion “as a result of man’s activities.”42  In addition, Congress found
that these species and population stocks should “not be permitted to
diminish below their optimum sustainable population.”43   Marine mammals
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44. Id. § 1362(1)(C).  The Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to prepare
conservation plans “as soon as possible, for any species or stock designated as depleted
under this subchapter, except that a conservation plan need not be prepared if the Secretary
determines that it will not promote the conservation of the species or stock.”  Id. §
1383b(b)(1)(C).  If the stock is below optimum sustainable population, the Secretary has,
in the past, elected to make a depleted determination under the Marine Mammals Protection
Act (MMPA), instead of listing the marine mammal as endangered or threatened. KALO ET
AL., supra note 41, at 734.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1).  
46. Id. § 1372(b).  
47. Id. § 1382(a).
48. See OPR 2, supra note 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, 35 Fed. Reg. 8,495 (1973).
53. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12)(A)(i).  
that are listed as endangered under the ESA are depleted within the
meaning of the MMPA.44
This Act prohibits, with certain exceptions, the taking of marine
mammals in U.S. waters, and by U.S. citizens on the high seas.45  It also
largely prohibits the importation of these marine mammals into the United
States.46   NOAA proposed this regulation pursuant to its authority under
the MMPA.47
The right whale is currently below optimum sustainable population.48
At the species’ current level of mortality, right whales will be unable to
rebuild and are in immediate danger of extinction.49  It is unclear whether
the right whale population is static, undergoing a slight decline, or is
slightly increasing.50  Regardless of this lack of knowledge, scientific
estimates predict the population’s extinction within 200 years.51
B.  Endangered Species Act
The Northern right whale, which includes both the North Atlantic and
North Pacific populations, was listed as endangered under the precursor to
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Endangered Species Conservation
Act of 1969.52  NMFS is responsible for protecting species of the order of
Cetacea (whales and dolphins) under the ESA and the MMPA.53
The ESA was enacted to protect certain species of fish, wildlife, and
plants that are “so depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or
346 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:2
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(2).  The statute requires a determination as to whether a species
is endangered or threatened because of any one of five factors.  The factors are: “(A) the
present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B)
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease
or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; (E) other natural or
man-made factors affecting its continued existence.”  Id. §§ 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E).  NMFS is
to make this determination  based only on the best available scientific information, after
conducting a status review of the species, and reviewing what other governments have done
for this species.  Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 1532(6).  
56. Id. § 1531(3)(C)(20).  The stated purpose of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is
to conserve the ecosystems on which endangered and threatened species depend, to provide
for the protection of the endangered and threatened species through programs, and to take
all steps necessary to implement the treaties mentioned in a separate subsection.  Id. §
1531(b).  
57. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).  
58. Id. § 1533(a)(2)(A).
59. Id. § 1533(f).  
60. Enumeration of Endangered Marine and Anadromous Species, 50 C.F.R.
§ 224.101(b) (2006). 
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
62. KALO ET AL., supra note 41, at 746.
63. Id. 
threatened with extinction.”54  Under the ESA, an endangered species is one
that is in “danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range.”55   Whereas, a threatened species is “any species which is likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all
or a significant portion of its range.”56
 The ESA empowers the Secretary of Commerce to make a
determination that a species be listed as endangered or threatened, and that
the species’ habitat be labeled as a critical habitat.57  The Secretary of
Commerce then informs the Secretary of the Interior, who, if he or she
concurs, “shall list such species.”58  The Act further requires the Secretary
to develop and implement recovery plans for the “conservation and
survival” of the listed species.59  The Secretary of Commerce designated the
right whale as endangered pursuant to the ESA.60
Like the MMPA, the ESA protects wildlife through the prohibition of
activities that could constitute a “take” of the protected species.  The ESA
defines “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”61
NMFS’ regulations interpret “harm” to encompass “significant habitat
modification or degradation.”62  NMFS’ regulations apply this interpreta-
tion of a “takings” to marine listed species.63  This regulation further
enumerates the myriad of prohibitions against approaching right whales,
2008]    The Proposed Rule to Implement Vessel Speed Restrictions 347
64. Id.
65. Special Prohibitions for Endangered Marine Mammals, 50 C.F.R. § 224.103(c)
(2006).  There are many exceptions to these prohibitions.  These exceptions include: vessels
sanctioned by NMFS, vessels conducting whale-watch activities, vessels conducting whale
entanglement rescues, vessels unable to comply due to lack of maneuverability, and captains
of vessels who believe it would cause imminent harm to either persons or the vessel if the
vessel was prohibited from approaching a right whale.  Id. § 224.103(c)(3).  
66. Id. § 224.103(c)(2)(i).  This Comment discusses some of the difficulties mariners face
in spotting right whales, and some of the behavioral patterns of right whales that hinder the
whales’ ability to spot passing ships.  This Comment also discusses the steps the U.S. Coast
Guard (Coast Guard) and NMFS have taken to reduce ship collisions; namely, the mandatory
ship reporting requirements promulgated in 1999, and still in effect in 2006.  See Mandatory
Ship Reporting Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,229 (June 1, 1999) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
169). 
67. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299, 36,301
(proposed June 26, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224). 
68. Id. 
69. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2000).  The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) goes on to state: “particularly the profound
influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare
and development of man. ”  Id.
including vessel speed.64  Under the regulation, vessels are prohibited from
coming within 500 yards of a right whale, and are required to take
avoidance measures.65  These avoidance measures include the mandatory
retreat from a right whale at a “slow safe speed.”66  In addition to actions
taken as a result of ESA consultations, the U.S. Navy (the Navy) has
engaged in efforts to reduce their interaction with right whales.67  This
includes “issuing advisories to its fleets to ‘use extreme caution and use
slow safe speed’ when near right whales, limiting vessel transits through
right whale habitat when not adversely affecting a vital mission, and
posting trained marine mammal lookouts.”68
C.  National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was passed,
in part, to help reduce the impact of man’s activity on “the interrelations of
all components of the natural environment.”69  NEPA was enacted as a
“policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local
governments, and other concerned public and private organizations,” to use
all practical means at its disposal to create an environment in which “man
348 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:2
70. Id.
71. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
72. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v).
73. NOAA Program Planning and Integration, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, National Environmental Policy Act Handbook 2.1.1.1, available at
http://www.nepa.noaa.gov/NEPA_HANDBOOK.pdf.
74. Id. at 4.8.1.
75. Id. 
76. NOAA, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2006), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/deis.pdf [hereinafter NOAA DEIS].
77. Id.  
78. KALO ET AL., supra note 41, at 104; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2000).
and nature can exist in productive harmony,” and provide for an
environment that present and future generations of Americans can enjoy.70
Perhaps the most important aspect of NEPA is the requirement of an
environmental impact statement (EIS).  All agencies of the federal govern-
ment, under NEPA, are required to include in “every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” a detailed
statement.71  The detailed statement is to include: the environmental impact
the proposed action will have; adverse environmental effects which are
unavoidable; alternatives; the “relationship between local short-term uses
of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity; and any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources.”72  NOAA defines a major federal action as “[a]n activity, such
as a plan, project or program, which may be fully or partially funded,
regulated, conducted, or approved by a Federal agency.”73  Many agencies
will prepare an environmental assessment (EA) to determine whether a full
EIS is required.  If the agency finds no impact based on the EA, a finding
of no significant impact (FONSI) is issued and no EIS is required.74
Conversely, if the agency finds a significant impact, an EIS is required
under NEPA.75
In July 2006, pursuant to NEPA and NOAA regulations implementing
the policies behind NEPA, NMFS prepared a draft EIS analyzing the
potential environmental impacts of implementing the operational measures
of this regulation, as well as the proposed alternatives.76  NMFS stated that
this EIS “commenced after a preliminary environmental assessment came
to a finding of potentially significant impacts on the human environment.”77
Review of agency decisions under NEPA will follow the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).78  This means that as long as the agency in its EIS can articulate a
2008]    The Proposed Rule to Implement Vessel Speed Restrictions 349
79. KALO ET AL., supra note 41, at 104.  “[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject
to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has
considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.”  Strycker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (internal quotations
omitted).     
80. Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1996).
81. Id. at 988.  
82. Id. at 992.  
83. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1997).
84. Id. at 588.
85. Id. at 632.  
rational connection between its proposed action and the facts at hand, a
court would not find the proposed action to be arbitrary or capricious under
the APA.79
D.  Three Landmark Cases
1. Strahan v. Coxe
In 1996, a conservationist brought an action under the ESA and the
MMPA, claiming that Massachusetts violated these acts by authorizing
lobster and gillnet gear in critical whale habitat, and by maintaining lenient
whale watching rules.80  The U.S. District Court for the District of Mass-
achusetts held that the licensing of fixed fishing gear by commercial fishing
operations “caused and [was] likely to continue to cause actual harm to
endangered whales” and that licensing could result in “impermissible
habitat modification to the whale’s environment.”81  Injunctive relief was
ordered to prevent some scientific research “whale watch” vessels from
being exempted from the 500 yard prohibition on approach of endangered
whales.82
2. Strahan v. Linnon
One year later, the same conservationist filed an action against the U.S.
Coast Guard (Coast Guard).83  He claimed the Coast Guard and the
Secretary of Commerce violated the ESA, NEPA, MMPA, and the APA
when they “addressed inadequately the impact of Coast Guard activities on
various endangered marine mammals, especially the Northern Right
whale.”84  The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ordered
the Coast Guard to comply with NEPA, ESA, and MMPA.85  The Coast
Guard prepared an EIS pursuant to NEPA, revised its procedures to reduce
350 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:2
86. Id. at 588-89.  
87. Id.  
88. Id. at 593.  
89. Id. at 593-94.
90. Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 484 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2007).
91. Id. at 47.
92. Id.
ship strikes, and conducted ESA consultations with NMFS to determine if
these actions were likely to subject the right whales to further harm.86  On
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff’s cross-motion for
partial summary judgment, the district court held: the conservation program
adopted by the Coast Guard was not deficient under the ESA; the fact that
NMFS had only adopted recovery plans for two federally protected whales
did not violate the ESA; and the evidence did not support the contention
that the recovery plans could not achieve the stated goals of conservation
and survival of whale species.87
In this case, NMFS was held to have incorporated the best available
scientific and commercial data regarding the impact of the Coast Guard’s
activities on endangered marine mammals.88  Despite the higher numbers
of Coast Guard and Navy vessel ship strikes concurrent with NMFS’
regulations, the court found that NMFS used all available data in protecting
the right whales.89
3. Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez
In 2005, the Ocean Conservancy, the Humane Society of the United
States, and the Defenders of Wildlife, filed suit in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, alleging that NMFS, NOAA, and the U.S.
Department of Commerce, violated the ESA, MMPA, and the APA in their
failure to protect North Atlantic right whales.90  The plaintiffs sought
judicial review of NMFS’ denial of their petition for emergency measures
to protect whales.91  They submitted a petition for rulemaking in May 2005,
under the ESA and MMPA, seeking emergency measures to reduce the
number of ship strikes.92  The plaintiffs also argued that the Coast Guard
was violating both the ESA and the APA by failing to:
consult with NMFS regarding activities undertaken and authorized
by the Coast Guard which may affect North Atlantic right whales
or modify [their] critical habitat, by failing to use its authorities to
protect and recover the right whale, and by requiring commercial
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93. Id.
94. Id. at 50.
95. Id. at 50.  
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 54.
99. Id. at 53.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 54.
103. Id.
vessels to travel within traffic separation schemes (“TSS”)
inhabited by North Atlantic right whales.93
On October 25, 2006, the court ordered NMFS to report to the court an
estimated date for when it expected the final rule implementing the speed
restrictions to issue.94  It took NMFS over a year to respond; its ultimate
conclusion was that final action on the proposed rule would occur in June
2007.95  The plaintiffs then responded to the defendants’ notice of intention
on November 15, 2006.96  The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia then heard oral arguments on the cross motions for summary
judgment on March 16, 2007.97
NMFS determined that it did not want to “duplicate agency efforts and
reduce agency resources for a more comprehensive strategy, as well as risk
delaying implementation of the draft Strategy.”98  Moreover, NMFS con-
tended that putting together a long-term strategy was the best way to
effectively manage the continued decline of the North Atlantic right
whales.99  NMFS submitted a statement to the Marine Mammal Commis-
sion, contending that emergency measures would still require a comprehen-
sive environmental regulatory analysis, which would be time consuming,
and NMFS believed that its attention was better directed in full to the crisis
at hand.100
The court acknowledged that NMFS’ plan lacked detail and certainly
did not represent the policy choices envisioned by the environmental
groups challenging NMFS’ denial of their petition.101  However, the only
role for the court under the APA was to determine if NMFS’ denial of
plaintiffs’ petition for emergency measures was arbitrary, capricious, abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.102  The court
determined that it could not find for the plaintiffs under this standard, in
part because the court could not find that NMFS had relied on factors
Congress had not intended it to rely on.103
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104. North Atlantic Right Whale Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. 6729 (Feb. 13, 1997) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 217 & 222).  The 1997 rule was an interim final rule promulgated
to allow NMFS and state coastal management agencies to determine the effects this rule may
have on Coastal Zone Management Programs in states along the east coast.  Id. at 6730.
This rule differs from the rule proposed by NMFS in 1996 in many respects.  These
differences are beyond the scope of this paper and thus will not be discussed. 
105. Id. at 6729.  
106. Id.
107. Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,229 (June 1, 1999).  
108. Id.  Because of the continued decline in right whale population, this regulation was
deemed an interim rule with no statutory deadline for the mandatory ship reporting to be in
place.  Id. at 29,231.  Ships are to report general information that includes “ship’s identifica-
tion, time of report, course, speed, destination, estimated time of arrival, and intended track.”
Id. at 29,232.  The ships will receive a return confirmation and advise the ships of
information on how to avoid collision.  Id.  The information includes “warnings of the risk
of hitting right whales, where to obtain seasonal right whale advisories, and where to consult
for information about precautionary measures that mariners may take to reduce the risk of
hitting right whales.”  Id.  This regulation was promulgated in the hopes of increasing
mariners’ awareness of right whales and the areas they frequent, thereby reducing ship strike
mortalities.  Id.  In addition, the costs of this program were considered minimal and were to
be shared between the Coast Guard and NMFS.  Id.  The only burden on mariners was to
report their location via radio, and the Coast Guard considered this de minimis.  Id.
IV. NOAA’S EFFORTS TO PROTECT NORTH ATLANTIC RIGHT WHALES
A.  Prior Regulations
In 1997, NMFS proposed a regulation that prohibits approaches within
500 yards of a right whale by any aircraft, vessel, or other means.104  Any
vessel or aircraft nearing a right whale is required to depart from the area
at a slow, safe speed.105  This slow, safe speed is never delineated further
in the proposed regulation.  
Exceptions are made for emergencies allowing aircraft operations
(except whale watching activities); vessels providing whale disentangle-
ment, rescue efforts, or investigations; and for a vessel which is “restricted
in its ability to maneuver and unable to comply with the right whale
avoidance measures.”106
The Coast Guard proposed a rule on June 1, 1999 in an effort to reduce
ship strikes by Coast Guard vessels.107  This regulation established
mandatory ship reporting requirements designed to inform mariners of the
presence of whales in particular areas, so that the mariners may take
avoidance action.108  NMFS’ proposed regulations, to date, exempt U.S.
military and research vessels from the regulations promulgated to reduce
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109. Press Release, United States Department of Commerce, New Strategy Proposed to
Reduce Ship Collisions with Endangered North Atlantic Right Whales (June 1, 2004),
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/docs/04-R145_right_whale_ship_strike.pdf
[hereinafter Commerce Department Press Release]. 
110. Id.  Following the 1991 Right Whale Recovery Plan, NMFS established the recovery
plan implementation teams (implementation teams).  The implementation teams are com-
prised of both state and federal agencies, as well as other organizations, which provide
recommendations to NMFS on recovery activities.  Proposed Rule to Implement Speed
Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299, 36,301 (proposed June 26, 2006) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 224).  These teams were instrumental in adopting the aerial surveys conducted by
NOAA, previously discussed in this paper.  Id.  The implementation teams also provide
educational materials to mariners to inform them on right whale activities, habitats, and other
information to assist in the reduction of vessel strikes.  Id. 
111. Kraus et al., supra note 30 at 562.  
112. Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for
Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction, 69 Fed. Reg. 30,857 (proposed June 1, 2004) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224).  NOAA also recognized that the right whale has failed to
recover despite prior regulations, and that the 2004 regulation is designed to reduce threats
of ship strikes and mortalities.  Id.
113. Id. at 30,858.
114. Angelia S. M. Vanderlaan & Christopher T. Taggart, Vessel Collisions with Whales:
The Probability of Lethal Injury Based on Vessel Speed, 23 MARINE MAMMAL SCI. 144, 145
(2007).  The scientists’ arguments in favor of the vessel speed restrictions rested on several
premises: (1) that the right whale is the most endangered of the baleen whales; (2) the
population is diminishing at an astounding rate; (3) the right whale could become extinct
within 200 years if something is not done soon; (4) vessel strikes account for the most
documented fatalities of right whales; (5) at the present time, “vessel-kill rates remain high.”
Id.
the likelihood of ship strikes of North Atlantic right whales.  However,
military and research vessels are encouraged to voluntarily comply.109
In the face of the proposed regulation discussed infra, NOAA already
had regulations in place that included conducting aerial surveys to provide
continuous information to mariners of right whale sightings and habitat,
mandatory ship reporting systems applied to mariners entering right whale
habitat, and regional recovery plan implementation teams.110  These prior
regulations sometimes referred to as “increased awareness” have done little
if anything, to protect right whales.111  These regulations were proposed in
2004 for right whale ship strike reduction.112  NOAA recognized that this
problem “requires additional, more pro-active measures to reduce or
eliminate the threat of ship strikes to right whales.”113  Following this
advanced notice of rulemaking, several scientists urged that emergency
measures be implemented to reduce vessel speeds in the east coast regions
of the United States and reduce right whale mortality resulting from ship
strikes.114  Changes in the operations of vessels within the right whale
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115. Id. at 145-46.
116. Press Release, NOAA, NOAA Recommends New East Coast Ship Traffic Routes to
Reduce Collisions with Endangered Whales (Nov. 17, 2006),  available at http://www.nmfs.
noaa.gov/mediacenter/docs/111406_ShipTrafficRoutes_FINAL_RHD.pdf [hereinafter
NOAA Press Release].  NOAA studied the typical travel patterns of the right whales and the
shipping traffic in those areas.  Right whales typically travel south from Canada and New
England to Florida and Georgia in the winter to their nursing and calving grounds.  Id.
These areas are frequented by increased ship traffic, and thus these areas were targeted by
NOAA’s recommendations of shipping routes.  NOAA scientists placed these routes “where
vessels would be less likely to encounter right whales, in addition to minimizing economic
impacts, and insuring safety of navigation.”  Id.  This is directly in line with NOAA’s stated
purpose for the regulation discussed in this paper.  NOAA DEIS, supra note 76, at 1-1.  
117. Kraus et al., supra note 30, at 562.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 561.  The right whale population was declining at a rate of about two percent
per year.  Id.  Because of the deaths of these eight right whales, scientists were urging NOAA
to take emergency measures to prevent the possibility of eight or more whale deaths between
the time of the journal article (2005) and the proposed rulemaking (2006).  Id.  The deaths
of these whales in such a short time period (sixteen months) were “unprecedented in 25 years
of study of this species.”  Id.
habitat and migratory paths is necessary to ensure the reduction in ship
strike mortalities.115
In November 2006, after this regulation was proposed, NOAA esta-
blished a set of recommended vessel routes “to reduce the likelihood of
ship collisions in key right whale habitats.”116  NOAA urged ship captains
to use these recommended shipping routes when entering or leaving the
ports of Jacksonville and Fernandina in Florida, Brunswick in Georgia, and
Cape Cod Bay in Massachusetts.
B.  Current Proposed Regulation
Scientists firmly believe that the current measures implemented by
NMFS are not enough to save the right whale from extinction.117  In fact,
scientists believed, as early as 2005, that emergency measures should be
implemented to reduce vessel speeds and to reroute commercial and
military ships as NOAA recommended in the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rule-making.118  As discussed earlier in this Comment, from 2004-2005
there were eight recorded deaths including six adult females, three of which
were carrying near term fetuses.119  If the death of one right whale can
severely hinder the recovery of the species, perhaps emergency measures
should have been implemented as scientists urged.
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120. NOAA asserted its purpose and need for this regulation as: “reduc[ing] the number
and severity of vessel collisions with North Atlantic right whales, thereby contributing to the
recovery and sustainability of the species, while minimizing the economic effects on the
shipping industry and maritime commerce.”  NOAA DEIS, supra note 76, at ES-2.
121. NOAA, Proposed Rule Summary, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/
proposed_rule_summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Proposed Rule
Summary].  Under the APA, agencies are required to publish advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register, and provide for “(1) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which
the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.”  5 U.S.C. § 533(b) (2000).  After the notice
and comment period, the agency is required to give all interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking through written comments, views, or arguments, “with or
without the opportunity for oral argument.”  Id. § 533(c). During this advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking, NMFS allowed for a sixty-day comment period.  Proposed Rule to
Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299 (proposed June 26, 2006) (to be codified
50 C.F.R. pt 224).  Many of the comments NMFS received requested more time for
comment, so NMFS extended the comment period from August 25, 2006 to October 5, 2006.
Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions to Reduce Right Whale Strikes; Extension
of Public Comment Time, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,440 (proposed Aug. 24, 2006) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 224).
122. NOAA Proposed Rule Summary, supra note 121, at 1.  The SMAs proposed in this
rule are discussed further in this paper.
123. Id.
124. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. at 36,305.
125. Id.
In June 2006, NOAA proposed a new set of regulations to reduce ship
strikes of right whales.120  This regulation was different from the June 2004
Advanced Notice of Public Rule-Making in several substantial ways.  This
regulation put the emphasis on the ten knot speed restriction rather than the
twelve or fourteen knot restriction.  This was due in part to NMFS’
recognition that a ten-knot speed restriction has a greater conservation
value for right whales.121  In addition, this regulation would impose
seasonally managed areas (SMAs) along the Mid-Atlantic coast and would
extend to thirty nautical miles, whereas the June 2004 rule extended SMAs
twenty to thirty nautical miles.122  The specified times at which this
regulation applies were modified from the June 2004 proposed rule, and the
economic analyses were updated and included in the draft EIS.123
This proposed regulation applies to all domestic and international
vessels sixty-five feet or greater in length.124  Due to substantial regional
differences in the east coast of the United States, NMFS divided the east
coast into three areas: the Northeastern United States (NEUS), Mid-
Atlantic United States (MAUS), and Southeastern United States (SEUS).125
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126. Id. 
127. Id.
128. Id. 
129. NOAA DEIS, supra note 76, at 2-10-2-13.  For the table listing the alternatives and
operational measures implemented under each alternative, see id.
130. Id.  For specifics on the seasonal management areas (SMAs) restrictions for each of
the three areas, see id. DMAs are implemented at a time when a certain amount of right
whales are sighted in a particular area.  NMFS is proposing a system whereby NMFS would
draw a circle around that particular area and vessels would be required to “transit through
DMAs at a reduced speed, or would have to route around that area.”  Id.  Routing measures
apply to the Southeastern United States (SEUS) and the NEUS, and are proposed to deflect
major ship traffic from right whale aggregations.  Id.  
131. Elements one through four were non-regulatory.  Only portions of element five were
addressed by this proposed rulemaking—the operational measures for recreational and
commercial mariners.  These operational measures were:
(1) continue ongoing conservation and research activities to reduce the threat of ship
strikes;
(2) develop and implement additional mariner education and outreach programs;
(3) conduct ESA section 7 consultations, as appropriate, with Federal agencies that
operate or authorize the use of vessels in waters inhabited by right whales;
(4) develop a Right Whale Conservation Agreement with the Government of
Canada;
(5) establish new operational measures for commercial and recreational mariners.
Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299, 36,302 (proposed
June 26, 2006) (to be codified 50 C.F.R. pt 224). This paper addresses only the speed
restriction portion of element five, because ship strikes are one of the largest concerns for
the right whale population.
The proposed regulation would reduce ship speeds to ten knots or less.126
However, NMFS invited comments on vessel speed restrictions of twelve
knots or less, and fourteen knots or less, in light of concerns about the
additional reduction of risk to the right whales, and the increased costs of
stricter speed limits.127 This proposed regulation includes measures
designed to coincide with vessel traffic patterns, ocean conditions, and right
whale behavior at certain times during the year and in areas where the risk
of collision is particularly high.128
This regulation includes six alternatives: (1) no action; (2) dynamic
management areas (DMAs); (3) speed restrictions in designated areas; (4)
recommended shipping routes; (5) combination of alternatives one through
four; and (6) (strongly preferred) a right whale ship reduction strategy.129  All
of these alternatives were analyzed in light of the operational measures,
which are: new routing requirements, DMAs, SMAs, and speed restrictions
for each of the three previously mentioned areas of the east coast.130  NOAA’s
strategy consists of five elements for reducing the threat of ship strikes, but
only element five was addressed by the proposed rule.131  Element five is to
2008]    The Proposed Rule to Implement Vessel Speed Restrictions 357
132. Id.
133. Shawn Zeller, Whales vs. National Security; Coast Guard will Ignore Proposed
Speed Limit, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (July 14, 2006).  This quote was taken from a
letter to NOAA last year from then—Coast Guard commandant Thomas H. Collins.  Some
of the public comments NMFS received regarding this regulation recognize the national
security concerns of the military; however, they also note that the military enjoys a blanket
exemption from these rules and regulations designed to protect right whales because of those
same national security concerns.  For a more comprehensive discussion of this blanket
exemption and a proposed alternative by the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW),
see infra note 158 and accompanying text.
134. Zeller, supra note 133.  Despite the sentiment within the shipping industry regarding
the speed limits, many of these vessels currently travel well over eighteen to twenty-two
knots, and this regulation will significantly slow the commercial vessels.  
135. Brake for Whales, supra note 37, at  A14.  For a more complete discussion on NMFS
assessment of the economic impacts this regulation will have on various commercial
operations, see supra Section III, C & D.
136. Id.
137. See David W. Laist et al., Collisions Between Ships and Whales, 17 MARINE
MAMMAL SCI. 35 (2001).
“establish new operational measures for commercial and recreational
mariners.”132
There is evidence to suggest that some members of the Coast Guard feel
that the proposed speed limit on vessels will “threaten national security and
set a dangerous precedent for regulation of International waters.”133
Members of the shipping industry feel similarly.  In fact, the vice president
of the World Shipping Council, Donald L. O’Hare, argues, “[w]e haven’t
seen any scientific evidence that slowing down will prevent ship strikes or
reduce [whale] mortality.”134  Thomas Valleau, executive director of the
North Atlantic Ports Association, said that he is worried that NMFS’ analysis
underestimates the effect the vessel speed restriction will have on the cargo
shipping industry.135  Mr. Valleau would like to see a “better analysis.”136
V. THE CONTINUING DECLINE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC RIGHT WHALE
A.  Ship Strikes—Scientific Data Available
Research has indicated that vessel strikes are the leading cause of death
and injury to right whales.  There were many reports and databases that
NOAA considered in its speed restrictions proposal.  One such database
found a direct relationship between the occurrence of a whale strike and the
speed of the vessel involved in the collision.137  The authors concluded that
the most whale deaths occurred when the vessel was traveling at a speed of
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138. Id. at 57.  See also, Comprehensive Assessment Report, supra note 24, at 1.
139. Comprehensive Assessment Report, supra note 24, at 29.
140. Richard M. Pace III & Gregory K. Silber, Simple Analyses of Ship and Large Whale
Collisions: Does Speed Kill?, Presentation at the Sixteenth Biennial Conference on the
Biology of Marine Mammals, San Diego (Dec. 12-16, 2005) available at http://www.nmfs.
noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/poster_pace-silber.pdf.
141. Alena S. Jensen & Gregory K. Silber, Large Whale Ship Strike Database, Technical
Memorandum, NMFS-OPR 25, 25-37 (2003), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
pr/pdfs/shipstrike/lwssdata.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 4.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Vanderlaan & Taggart, supra note 114, at 144.
148. Id.  There are four injury classes prior scientific reports have used, and which this
current scientific report is using.  The four classes are: “killed (carcass observed); severe
(bleeding wounds and/or blood in the water); minor (visible nonbleeding wound, signs of
distress, no report of blood); none apparent (resighted, no visible wound or distress, animal
fourteen knots or greater.138  However, of the forty known or suspected whale
encounters, a particular vessel has been identified only three times in the
killing of a right whale and information on vessel speed was known in only
two of those cases.139  In addition, one database found that vessels that were
involved in whale strikes traveled at a higher speed than normal.140
One database detailed 292 records of known ship strikes.141  Of those
292, 134 of the vessels were identified.142  Of the 134 cases of known vessel
type, there were 23 reported incidents of Navy vessels hitting whales
(17.1%), and 9 cases for Coast Guard vessels (6.7%).143  This number is
substantially greater than the reported ship strikes for containers/cargo
ships/freighters at 14.9%.  The reason for the higher reported incidences by
military vessels may be that the military has a better ship strike notification
system, and may not be a result of a higher number of actual strikes.144 The
explanation for the lower number of reported incidences involving
freighter/cargo ships may be that the captains of the larger container ships
may be unaware that a whale strike occurred at all.145  Another plausible
explanation is that some captains, if not required to report a ship strike, may
not do so because they fear the consequences, or the time it may involve.146
In 2007, as a result of the increasing awareness of vessel speed con-
tributing to right whale mortalities, scientists analyzed published historical
records of vessels striking right whales and other large whales.147  The
scientists examined the influence of the vessel speeds on both lethal and non-
lethal injuries.  Lethal injuries are defined as “killed or severely injured,”
while non-lethal injuries are defined as “minor or no apparent injury.”148
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resumed prestrike activity).”  Id. at 146.  There is also a fifth “unknown-injury class (animal
not observed again and no report of blood).”  Id.
149. Id. at 144-45.
150. Id.  See also Comprehensive Assessment Report, supra note 24.  
151. Vanderlaan & Taggart, supra note 114, at 149.
152. Id. 
153. Id.  The authors note that the data used in this report are limited and do not
incorporate all variables, such as “species of whale, age, size or mass, and behavior; and
vessel type, size or mass, and angle of attack.”  Id.  However, the authors point out that the
data used are the only published data that include vessel speed observations.  Id.  The
authors also discuss the fact that they cannot dismiss whale avoidance measures as a possible
explanation for the few reports of slow moving vessel strikes.  Id. at 152.  However, as
discussed previously in this Comment, whales, particularly right whales, show little to no
behavioral response to the sounds of an approaching vessel and research indicates that right
whales do not always avoid vessels when “foraging or socializing.”  Owen C. Nichols &
Hauke L. Kite-Powell, Analysis of Risk to North Atlantic Right Whales (Eubalaena
glacialis) from Shipping Traffic in Cape Cod Bay 1 (2005), available at www.nero.noaa.
gov/shipstrike/doc/Nichols_CCB%20vessel%20traffic.pdf.  See also Doug Nowacek et al.,
North Atlantic Right Whales (Eubalaena Glacialis) Ignore Ships but Respond to Alerting
Stimuli, 271 THE ROYAL SOCIETY 227, 227-31 (2004).  In addition, research indicates that
mariners may have a difficult time spotting the whales due to their dark coloration and “their
low profile when feeding at or beneath the surface, resting or nursing.”  Nichols & Kite-
Powell, supra, at 1.  
154. Vanderlaan & Taggart, supra note 114, at 152.
Historical scientific records suggest that the most frequently reported victims
of vessel strikes are the fin whale, humpback, North Atlantic right whale, the
gray whale, as well as several other large whale species.149  However, these
historical records also show that North Atlantic right whales are more prone
to ship strikes than any other large whales.150
This report concluded that the greatest change in the probability of lethal
injury to a large whale is between vessel speeds of 8.6 and 15 knots.151  The
large whales have an 80% chance of mortality when the vessels are traveling
at 15 knots, and a 20% chance when the vessel is traveling at 8.6 knots.152
Speeds below 11.8 knots drop the chance of mortality down below 50%, and
at speeds above 15 knots mortalities “asymptomatically increase toward
100%.”153  The authors conclude that their analyses “provide compelling
evidence that as vessel speed falls below 15 knots, there is a substantial
decrease in the probability that a vessel strike to a large whale will prove
lethal.154
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155. NOAA Proposed Rule Summary, supra note 121.
156. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299, 36,300
(proposed June 26, 2006) (to be codified 50 C.F.R. pt 224).
157. Id. at 36,305.
158. Commerce Department Press Release, supra note 109, at 29.  In the Northeast, these
regulations would affect the Cape Cod Bay area, an area off Race Point, the Great South
Channel, and in the Gulf of Maine.  Id.  These areas of the Northeast were designated as
right whale feeding grounds.  Id.  In 1994, Cape Cod Bay was designated as a Federal
Critical Habitat for right whales, because of its recognized importance as a feeding ground,
key socialization area, and as a “nursery area” for mothers and calves.  Nichols & Kite-
Powell, supra note 153, at 5.  The increasing traffic patterns in this area, coupled with the
right whales’ behavioral patterns, have caused several mortalities in this area, and many
probable undocumented whale ship strikes.  Id.  Three other areas were also designated as
Critical Habitat: Coastal Florida and Georgia (Sebastian Inlet, Florida to the Altamaha River,
Georgia), Great South Channel (east of Cape Cod), and North Pacific Ocean.  OPR 2, supra
note 4.  In 2006, NOAA further classified the North Pacific Ocean Critical Habitat to include
an area within the Gulf of Alaska and an area within the Bering Sea.  Id.  Critical Habitat is
defined by NOAA as:
Specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species at the time of
listing, if they contain physical or biological features essential to conservation, and
those features may require special management considerations or protection; and
[s]pecific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species if the agency
determines that the area itself is essential for conservation. 
NOAA Fisheries Office of Protected Resources Glossary, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
glossary.htm#c (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).   The International Whaling Commission listed
four areas of right whale habitat: feeding, calving, nursery, and breeding.  OPR 2, supra note
4.
159. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. at 36,300.
B.  The Information NMFS Considered in the 
Preparation of this Proposed Regulation
NOAA worked closely with mariners to come up with this regulation in
the hopes that this will help reduce the number of ship strikes.155  NOAA,
specifically NMFS, analyzed significant scientific data on mortalities of right
whales, and whether vessel speed is a significant contributory factor.156   This
regulation was tailored to work with existing traffic patterns of commercial
vessels, as well as each area’s patterns of right whale behavior.  In theory, this
regulation was implemented to prevent vessel traffic in certain areas of right
whale habitat, and during certain ocean conditions in that area.157  The ulti-
mate goal was to route “changes to reduce the overlap between the ships and
whales and/or speed reduction to give both animals and mariners additional
time to take avoidance action.”158  This regulation also purports to continue
the existing regulation efforts, and increase education about the plight of the
right whale and the continuing dangers this species faces.159
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160. NOAA DEIS, supra note 76, at 2-11.
161. Id. at ES-6.
162. Id.
163. Id
164. Id.
165. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000).
166. Proposed Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,299 36,308
(proposed June 26, 2006) (to be codified 50 C.F.R. pt 224).
167. Id.
168. See id. 
C.  NMFS’ Draft EIS
In its draft EIS, NMFS discussed the impacts that each alternative would
have on right whales.  NMFS concluded that the first alternative, no action,
would have a significant, long-term negative effect on the right whale
population.160  Alternative two “would have minor, direct, long-term, positive
effects on the right whale population.”161  NMFS concluded that alternative
three “would have direct, long-term positive effects,” and since alternative
three includes speed restrictions as a stand alone measure, the ten-knot
restriction would have a more positive effect on the right whale population
than the proposed fourteen-knot speed restriction.162  Alternative four “would
have direct, long-term, positive effects on right whales in the NEUS and
SEUS, although it offers no protection in the MAUS, therefore the overall
effects are minor.”163  Alternative five “would have significant, direct, long-
term, positive effects on the right whale population; this alternative provides
the highest level of protection to the population.  Alternative [six] would also
have major, direct, long-term, positive effects on the population.”164
D.  NMFS’ Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
NMFS also prepared an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA)
pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA).165  This IRFA analyzed the
proposed alternatives in light of the economic impacts on the seven industries
directly affected by this proposed action: commercial shipping, high-speed
passenger ferries, regular-speed passenger ferries, high-speed whale watching
vessels, regular-speed whale watching vessels, commercial fishing vessels,
and charter fishing vessels.166  This analysis concluded that the right whale
ship strike reduction strategy alternative would reduce annual revenues to
various businesses, but that a high-speed restriction, namely that of twelve or
fourteen knots, would not be adequate to protect right whales.167  This is a
tough balance for NMFS to manage, especially based on the very strong
comments it received in response to this proposed regulation.168  However,
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NMFS covered all aspects of economic hardship on small business entities,
as well as larger commercial businesses, and weighed those economic
impacts against the effects just one more whale death could have on an entire
species.169
This analysis concluded that the no-action alternative would clearly be
preferred by all small business entities.170  In addition, it was found that,
although the DMA alternative would be preferable to small business entities
compared to the proposed alternative, relying on this measure alone would
not afford the right whales the protection they need.171
NMFS ultimately concluded that the economic impact on small business
entities of the recommended shipping routes alternative is indeterminate at
this time.172  In addition, the combination of alternatives (alternative five
which encompasses alternatives one through four) would have a greater
impact on small entities, but this alternative would provide “a higher level of
protection to the right whale population since it would reduce the amount
and/or severity of ship strikes when compared with the proposed
alternative.”173
VI. THE RATIONAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROPOSED VESSEL SPEED
REDUCTION REGULATION AND THE DATA AVAILABLE
A.  Rational Basis for the Regulation Based on Ship Speeds and Resulting 
Morality Rates
The regulation discussed in this Comment proposes vessel speed limits
as low as ten knots, and NMFS announced it would accept public comments
regarding limits as high as fourteen knots.174  Given the existence of data
asserting that the danger of mortality significantly decreases for large whales
as vessel speeds fall below fifteen knots, NMFS should not accept proposals
for vessel speeds above the originally proposed ten knots.175  Even at ten
knots, scientific data suggests that large whale mortality can rise as high as
thirty percent.176  According to the very same scientific literature and data, it
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is only at speeds below 11.8 knots that the chance of mortality drops below
50%.177  If NMFS accepts proposals for fourteen or even twelve knots, NMFS
will be consigning the right whales to extinction.  
B.  Rational Connection between the Regulation and the Data Available
and the Rational Basis Based on the Oblivious Nature of Right Whales
This scientific data needs to be taken into consideration, especially with
regard to right whales, because they do not seem to respond to ships.
Scientific evidence also suggests that on 64 of 138 occasions, adult right
whales turned into the path of a parallel-running small motorized vessel.178
Even with the mariner alerting systems now in place, in order for a vessel
operator to avoid collision with a whale, the whale must be detected and the
operator must maneuver to avoid the whale.179  Once detected, it is difficult
for operators to determine the ultimate path of the whale, and operators may
be unsuccessful in avoiding collision.180  Moreover, in 2006, scientists
reported that small vessel operators are unable to consistently detect and
avoid manatees.181  Yet another scientist reports a vessel collision with two
or more whales where no avoidance action was taken because “the vessel
operator anticipated the whales would dive to avoid the vessel.”182
C.  Rational Basis Versus the Public Comments
The Georgia Conservancy was one of many organizations to submit
comments during the notice and comment period of the proposed regulation.
In its letter to the Office of Protected Resources (OPR), the Conservancy
recognized the possible harms that this regulation could impose on the
commercial and recreational industries.  However, as the Conservancy
pointed out, “these concerns of added travel time and expense are trivial
compared to the extinction of a species.”183
The International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) was also a strong
supporter of the ten-knot speed restriction on vessels.  In fact, the IFAW
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believes that any meaningful ship strike reduction strategy must include: “(1)
a mandatory vessel routing system, (2) meaningful ship speed restrictions,
and (3) comprehensive enforcement mechanisms.”184  In its letter to NMFS,
IFAW quoted the same scientific evidence NMFS used in its determination
of the vessel speed restrictions.185  The IFAW also expressed concern over the
blanket exemption for military vessels, and proposed abolishing the blanket
exemption and asserted that:
[G]overnment vessels be added to the list of vessels subject to this
rule with a condition that allows Navy and Coast Guard vessels to
ignore mandated speed restrictions if, in the judgment of the vessel
captain, doing so would jeopardize or compromise national security
or the safety of life at sea, but only in those narrow circumstances.186
The International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) also submitted
comments to this proposed regulation.187  The ICCL was concerned about the
safety issues the new speed restrictions will cause as a result of maneuvering
ships at lower speeds.188  The ICCL also contended that there is no indication
that reducing ship speeds will reduce the amount of vessel strikes, and that if
a 70,000 ton vessel hit a right whale, speed would not be a factor in its
injury.189  ICCL contended, moreover, that reducing ship speeds will actually
keep a vessel in the path of a right whale for a longer period of time.190  This
argument ultimately fails.  As the previously discussed scientific evidence
indicates, the faster a ship is traveling, the higher chance of mortality for
whales in general.  Reducing the ship speeds will ultimately help mariners
avoid hitting whales, and help the mariners steer out of the way of the whales.
In addition, with the mariner awareness and ship reporting systems,
previously discussed in this paper, mariners will be aware of the location of
the whales, and especially the whales’ feeding, calving, and breeding
grounds; these are the times the whales are most vulnerable.  
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In addition, the Provincetown Business Guild submitted comments on the
proposed regulation.  The Guild contended that ferry and whale-watching
vessels (90 to 200 feet) have historically struck fewer whales than other
similarly sized vessels, because “they are run by vigilant and professional
crews.”191  Relying on this contention, the Guild argued that the speed
restriction should only apply to vessels 262 feet or greater in length.192
The Guild’s comment flies in the face of recent scientific evidence that
NMFS examined in the proposal of this regulation.  As previously discussed
in this Comment, this scientific data suggest that whale-watching vessels are
just as capable of hitting right whales, and causing harm or death to the
whales.193  Even if the large vessels (whether whale-watching vessels or not)
are more vigilant, the data shows that higher speeds cause higher mortality
rates in whales, and that whales are unable to avoid collision with such
vessels.194  Moreover, regardless of whether the whale-watching vessels
traditionally strike fewer whales per year than other larger vessels, preventing
one to two ship strikes per year can help rebuild the population of the right
whales to a sufficient level to avoid extinction in the coming years.
D.  NMFS’ Failure to Have an Enforcement Mechanism and Penalties for
Non-Compliance and its Effect on the Rational Basis for the Regulation
NMFS does not have an enforcement mechanism in existence or a
proposed mechanism to enforce whichever speed limit restriction NMFS
ultimately adopts.  The IFAW contends that NMFS lacks the necessary
resources to adequately monitor ship speeds.195  NMFS needs to have
applicable enforcement mechanisms in place in order for this regulation to
meet its goal under NMFS’ DEIS.  Whether the lack of enforcement
mechanisms and non-compliance penalties will rise to the level of arbitrary
and capricious under the APA remains to be seen.  There is a rational basis
for NMFS to conclude that there needs to be a regulation to reduce vessel
speeds and reroute some of the shipping patterns in high traffic areas.
However, if there is no enforcement or penalties for non-compliance, this
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regulation may be seen by some to be an arbitrary and capricious agency
action.  NMFS stated recently that it is working on enforcement mechanisms
and penalties with the Coast Guard and that they are fairly confident the
Coast Guard will assist them in establishing enforcement.196  How the
shipping industry will react to the Coast Guard (who is exempted from this
regulation, enforcing the ship speeds) remains to be seen.  This reaction may
be more than NMFS bargains for, given that the Navy and Coast Guard
vessels attribute to a high percentage of right whale mortalities each year.
Several maritime organizations and other business entities expressed
concern over the lack of enforcement measures.  Moreover, because there is
little scientific evidence that a blanket speed restriction will reduce right
whale ship strikes and there is no enforcement mechanism in place, such
entities contend that the harm the regulation will cause to the shipping and
other industries, outweighs any putative benefits to the right whale
population.197
In order for this regulation to serve its deterrent purpose, NMFS needs to
develop substantial penalties for non-compliance.198  Given the fact that
implementing this regulation will ultimately cause some harm (financial,
time, or otherwise) to vessel operators, they also need to develop substantial
fines as a deterrent for non-compliance.  For example, in Australia, there are
substantial fines in place for intentionally moving closer to a whale than
permitted ($9,000), and on-the-spot fines for other breaches, which range
from $225 to $375.199
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on all of the scientific research available, and the comments
received in response to this regulation, NMFS should enforce a ten-knot
vessel speed restriction.  In addition to the ten-knot speed restriction, NMFS
should strongly consider implementing its other alternatives, which include
the SMAs and the DMAs in the southeast, northeast, and mid-Atlantic
regions.  Even when considering the economic impact analysis that NMFS
conducted, the loss of this species far outweighs the potential economic
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impacts this regulation could have.  There is a rational basis in concluding
that vessel speed restrictions can greatly reduce the number of right whale
deaths per year, thereby increasing the population of this species to a sustain-
able level.
In addition, NMFS must come up with an enforcement mechanism for
this new regulation, as well as significant penalties for non-compliance.  This
must be done as soon as possible to avoid the possibility of another wave of
right whale mortalities from ship strikes so soon after the unprecedented
wave of mortalities from 2004-2005.  If NMFS does not come up with
enforcement mechanisms and penalties for non-compliance, the regulation
will be seen by some to be an arbitrary and capricious action by NMFS, and
thus contrary to the APA.
Even the death of one female right whale can significantly alter the
population and push it further towards extinction.  If implemented immediate-
ly with enforcement measures and penalties for non-compliance, this regula-
tion, coupled with the recommended alteration of shipping routes proposed
in November of 2006, may ultimately help the whale population attain a
sustainable level, and even someday help take them off the endangered
species list.
